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SOVEREIGNTY: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE
Right of State to exercise authority within a specific 
territory = Westphalian tradition (Halliday and Shaffer)
Repercussions:
‒ Respect sovereign equality and independence of 
other States
‒ Rulemaking has territorial limits
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TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS
State-issued rules can only govern own territory
‒ “Jurisdiction … cannot be exercised by a State 
outside its territory” (§45)
States are only bound by international law if they agree
‒ Rules “emanate from their own free will” (§44)
1927 Lotus case (PCIJ)
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SOVEREIGNTY ON GLOBAL STAGE
UNDER STRAIN
1. International regulatory convergence
2. Increased corporate power, channeled through
alternative regulatory instruments (ARIs)
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1. INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
CONVERGENCE
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INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CONVERGENCE
Globalization causes legal norms in different jurisdictions to 
converge to a common point
Race-to-the-bottom (RTTB) (Delaware effect)
Or
Race-to-the-top (RTTT) (California effect)
And / or (?)
Unilateral regulatory globalization (Brussels effect)
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CONVERGENCE THROUGH RTTB
Goal: State seeks to attract MNC presence (tax revenue; job opportunities)
(Mostly) indirect process
1. State A de facto adopts same / laxer standard as State X to woo MNC
2. MNC agrees to State A’s offer = conduit 
3. State A de jure adopts State X standard (or lower)
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CONVERGENCE THROUGH RTTT
Goal: enterprise seeks access to strictly regulated market
1. MNC already active in State A; seeks access to strict State 
X market and complies with its rules
2. Production process is streamlined (scale effects; uniform 
brand) -> MNC de facto applies State X rules in State A
(Brussels effect!)
3. MNC lobbies State A to level playing field with competition
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State X’s rules are de facto applied in State A
- RTTB: State A offers the same low, or even lower, standards as State X to attract corporate 
investments
- RTTT: A corporation in State A behaves according to the rules of State X because it 
maintains a uniform production process
Corporations act as conduits
- RTTB: Corporation agrees to State A’s offer: 
the lower standard, based on that of State X, 
is formally adopted
- RTTT: Corporation lobbies State to adopt the 
rules of State X
State X’s rules are de 
jure applied in State A
FIRST CONCLUSION
Corporations act as intermediaries,
both in RTTB and RTTT
(Link with Abbott’s ‘Orchestration’ ?)
Circumvents sovereignty
11
12
2. CORPORATE MIGHT AND ALTERNATIVE
REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS (ARIS)
“… the political boundaries of nation states are too 
narrow and constrictive to provide adequate scope for 
modern, large-scale economic activities”
- GEORGE W. BALL, GLOBAL COMPANIES: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF WORLD BUSINESS, 1975!
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TECH REGULATION: POWER VACUUM
Sharp differences in ideology and geopolitical interests
‒ China + Russia = isolationism
‒ United States = laisser-faire 
‒ European Union = extraterritorial activism
No UN consensus + WTO powerless
Tech corporations take lead (‘norm entrepreneurship’)
‒ ‘Deterritorialization’ (Barkan)
‒ Resistance to state regulation (Eichensehr; Kilovaty; Cohen)
‒ ‘Circular relay of control’ (Harbinja and Karagiannopoulos) 
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THE EU AND ARIS
EU taps into corporate power through alternative regulatory 
instruments (ARIs)
Nuance the regulatory role of government institutions…
… by involving private actors…
… in the process of drafting and implementing rules
Weaken hard law’s dimensions of 
obligation, precision, and delegation (Abbott & Snidal)
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THE REGULATORY CONTINUUM
16
Eva Lievens, Protecting Children in the Digital Era: 
The Use of Alternative Regulatory Instruments (2010) 229
MAIN ADVANTAGES
Private expertise
Decentralised regulatory authority: fast adoption and revision
‒ Ex ante: nimble anticipatory action
‒ Ex post: effective enforcement
Multi-stakeholder process: 
‒ Higher quality
‒ Public accountability
‒ Higher compliance rates 
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GRAVITATION TOWARDS CODES OF CONDUCT
TO REGULATE MNCS
Regulate the activities of non-state actors…
… enhance their accountability in the international marketplace…
… by defining voluntary standards and principles
= do not threaten state sovereignty and equality
= construct a transnational, normative regime
(Helen Keller, Corporate Codes of Conduct and their Implementation: The Question of 
Legitimacy, in LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3 (2008))
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NEW TREND IN EU: 
‘HARD’ APPROACH TO CODES
EU determines design and implementation
‘Hardening’ of the three dimensions
‒ Obligation
‒ Precision
‒ Delegation
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OBLIGATION: FROM VOLUNTARY TO DE 
FACTO OBLIGATORY
Past: codes as voluntary ruleset
Now: codes as liability reduction mechanisms
‒ Article 83, 2 (j) GDPR
‒ Directive on Better Enforcement and Modernization of EU 
Consumer Protection
Direct link to punitive hard law: de facto obligatory
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PRECISION: FROM OPEN NORMS TO PRECISE 
STIPULATIONS
Past: codes as ‘open’ norms
Now: broad policy, codes to specify
‒ Tackling Online Disinformation: A European Approach 
(COM/2018/236 FINAL) 7–8 
‒ Recital 98; article 40, 2 GDPR
No longer vague; diminish corporate discretion
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DELEGATION: FROM NON-JUDICIAL 
MECHANISMS TO BINDING PROCEDURES
Past: non-judicial monitoring mechanisms 
Now: pre-approval and monitoring bodies
‒ Article 40, 5-9; article 41, 2 GDPR
Diminishes decentralised character; becomes more 
cumbersome to adopt and revise
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SECOND CONCLUSION:
FROM OPT-IN TO OBLIGATION?
Hardening of the three dimensions of law
- Obligation: from voluntary to de facto obligatory
- Precision: from open norms to precise stipulations
- Delegation: from non-judicial mechanisms to binding procedures
No longer voluntary; no longer discretionary; increasingly centralised
= friction with state sovereignty
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FINAL CONCLUSION
Is the international law system obsolete?
‒ International regulatory convergence
‒ Increasing power of tech corporations
‒ EU’s use of ARIs
Any role for sovereignty?
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